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  <title>Brent Coker: AI security guides and insights</title>
  <subtitle>Implementation-level analysis of AI security problems, grounded in the research literature: prompt injection, RAG isolation, agent tool use and red-teaming.</subtitle>
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  <updated>2026-11-10T00:00:00Z</updated>
  <author><name>Dr Brent Coker</name><uri>https://brentcoker.com/</uri></author>
  <icon>https://brentcoker.com/favicon.svg</icon>
  <entry>
    <title>Securing Autonomous AI Agents: Deterministic Gateways for Tool Use and Function Calling</title>
    <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://brentcoker.com/insights/securing-ai-agent-tool-calling"/>
    <id>https://brentcoker.com/insights/securing-ai-agent-tool-calling</id>
    <published>2026-11-10T00:00:00Z</published>
    <updated>2026-11-10T00:00:00Z</updated>
    <summary>AI agent security fails when agents hold their own credentials. A policy gateway, strict tool-call schemas and rare, clear approvals contain excessive agency.</summary>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Mitigating Indirect Prompt Injection in Multi-Tenant RAG Pipelines</title>
    <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://brentcoker.com/insights/indirect-prompt-injection-rag"/>
    <id>https://brentcoker.com/insights/indirect-prompt-injection-rag</id>
    <published>2026-11-10T00:00:00Z</published>
    <updated>2026-11-10T00:00:00Z</updated>
    <summary>How untrusted documents, emails and web pages hijack RAG sessions, and the privilege boundaries and deterministic output checks that contain the damage.</summary>
  </entry>
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